------------------------------
The psychologist Gary Klein tells the story of a team of firefighters that
entered a house in which the kitchen was on fire. Soon after they started
hosing down the kitchen, the commander heard himself shout, “Let’s get out
of here!” without realizing why. The floor collapsed almost immediately
after the firefighters escaped. Only after the fact did the commander realize
that the fire had been unusually quiet and that his ears had been unusually
hot. Together, these impressions prompted what he called a “sixth sense of
danger.” He had no idea what was wrong, but he knew something was wrong. It
turned out that the heart of the fire had not been in the kitchen but in the
basement beneath where the men had stood.
心理學家克萊恩（Gary Klein）曾經說過一個故事：一群消防隊員進入一間廚房著火的房
子，他們很快就把火熄滅了，消防隊長聽到他自己大喊：「馬上撤出！」他並不知道自己
為什麼會這樣說，但是當消防隊一離開，地板就垮掉了。事後，消防隊長才知道，因為這
場火比一般火災安靜，沒有劇烈燃燒的巨大聲音，而他的耳朵又感覺到比正常時更熱，這
激發了他的「危機第六感」（Sixth Sense of danger）。他並不知道有什麼地方不對，
但是他知道不對勁了，後來發現原來火源並不是在廚房，而是在地下室，消防隊員們就站
在火源上頭。
------------------------------------
評：
Soon after they started hosing down the kitchen
他們（消防隊）才開始澆灌而已，還沒把火熄滅
"沒有劇烈燃燒的巨大聲音" 原文所無，感謝譯者的創作
-----------------------------------
We have all heard such stories of expert intuition: the chess master who
walks past a street game and announces “White mates in three” without
stopping, or the physician who makes a complex diagnosis after a single
glance at a patient. Expert intuition strikes us as magical, but it is not.
Indeed, each of us performs feats of intuitive expertise many times each day.
Most of us are pitch-perfect in detecting anger in the first word of a
telephone call, recognize as we enter a room that we were the subject of the
conversation, and quickly react to subtle signs that the driver of the car in
the next lane is dangerous. Our everyday intuitive abilities are no less
marvelous than the striking insights of an experienced firefighter or
physician—only more common.
Expert intuition strikes us as magical
專家的直覺突然憑空而來，彷彿變魔術一般
pitch-perfect 「準確」沒翻
quickly react to subtle signs that the driver of the car in the next lane is
dangerous
用「危險駕駛，立刻做出因應的避禍措施」打發隔壁車道的危險駕駛，
反應確實很迅速。
only more common 都是日常小事而已嗎？
只是比較尋常罷了。
-----------------------------------
The psychology of accurate intuition involves no magic. Perhaps the best
short statement of it is by the great Herbert Simon, who studied chess
masters and showed that after thousands of hours of practice they come to see
the pieces on the board differently from the rest of us. You can feel Simon’
s impatience with the mythologizing of expert intuition when he writes: “The
situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to
information stored in memory, and the information provides the answer.
Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition.”
The psychology of accurate intuition involves no magic.
psychology 這裡不能翻譯為心理學；而是「心理過程」或「心理特點」
Longman Dictionary:
mental processes involved in believing in something or doing a certain
activity
OALD:
mental characteristics of a person or group
看到 -logy 就只會翻譯為「─學」，是初學翻譯的人才會有的愚蠢反射動作
當作：正確直覺的心理過程沒有包含任何魔術
"great" Herbert Simon 洪蘭大概覺得他不偉大吧？
pieces on the board
棋盤上的棋子
看「棋局」的方式
光看棋盤幹嘛呀？
坊間，市街之間，多指書坊。原文無。
------------------------------------
We are not surprised when a two-year-old looks at a dog and says “doggie!”
because we are used to the miracle of children learning to recognize and
name things. Simon’s point is that the miracles of expert intuition have the
same character. Valid intuitions develop when experts have learned to
recognize familiar elements in a new situation and to act in a manner that is
appropriate to it. Good intuitive judgments come to mind with the same
immediacy as “doggie!”
Simon’s point is that the miracles of expert intuition have the same
character.
洪蘭：賽蒙對專家直覺的奇蹟也是同樣的看法
當作：賽蒙認為專家直覺的奇蹟具有同樣的特性
Valid intuitions develop 沒翻出來
「專家在新的情境看到熟悉的元素時，會發展出合理的直覺，並依情境做恰當的行動」
name things 居然直接把它改為「叫名」（naming）！
譯者未免太濫用她的權力了吧!!
-----------------------------------
Unfortunately, professionals’ intuitions do not all arise from true
expertise. Many years ago I visited the chief investment officer of a large
financial firm, who told me that he had just invested some tens of millions
of dollars in the stock of Ford Motor Company. When I asked how he had made
that decision, he replied that he had recently attended an automobile show
and had been impressed. “Boy, do they know how to make a car!” was his
explanation. He made it very clear that he trusted his gut feeling and was
satisfied with himself and with his decision. I found it remarkable that he
had apparently not considered the one question that an economist would call
relevant: Is Ford stock currently underpriced? Instead, he had listened to
his intuition; he liked the cars, he liked the company, and he liked the idea
of owning its stock. From what we know about the accuracy of stock picking,
it is reasonable to believe that he did not know what he was doing.
one question that an economist would call relevant
relevant question 直接相關的問題，非「一定會問的一個問題」
accuracy of stock picking 如何正確選股
「選擇股票的知識」，好吧，不算太離譜。
-------------------
The specific heuristics that Amos and I studied provided little help in
understanding how the executive came to invest in Ford stock, but a broader
conception of heuristics now exists, which offers a good account. An
important advance is that emotion now looms much larger in our understanding
of intuitive judgments and choices than it did in the past. The executive’s
decision would today be described as an example of the affect heuristic,
where judgments and decisions are guided directly by feelings of liking and
disliking, with little deliberation or reasoning.
heuristics 是探索的過程或方法 （heuristic method or process）
一個心理學教授居然用「捷徑」潦草帶過，讓人匪夷所思。
------------------
When confronted with a problem—choosing a chess move or deciding whether to
invest in a stock—the machinery of intuitive thought does the best it can.
If the individual has relevant expertise, she will recognize the situation,
and the intuitive solution that comes to her mind is likely to be correct.
This is what happens when a chess master looks at a complex position: the few
moves that immediately occur to him are all strong. When the question is
difficult and a skilled solution is not available, intuition still has a
shot: an answer may come to mind quickly—but it is not an answer to the
original question. The question that the executive faced (should I invest in
Ford stock?) was difficult, but the answer to an easier and related question
(do I like Ford cars?) came readily to his mind and determined his choice.
This is the essence of intuitive heuristics: when faced with a difficult
question, we often answer an easier one instead, usually without noticing the
substitution.
--------------------------------
The spontaneous search for an intuitive solution sometimes fails—neither an
expert solution nor a heuristic answer comes to mind. In such cases we often
find ourselves switching to a slower, more deliberate and effortful form of
thinking. This is the slow thinking of the title. Fast thinking includes both
variants of intuitive thought—the expert and the heuristic—as well as the
entirely automatic mental activities of perception and memory, the operations
that enable you to know there is a lamp on your desk or retrieve the name of
the capital of Russia.
both variants of intuitive thought
直覺思考的兩種變化形式；不是各種直覺的思考
------------------------------
The distinction between fast and slow thinking has been explored by many
psychologists over the last twenty-five years. For reasons that I explain
more fully in the next chapter, I describe mental life by the metaphor of two
agents, called System 1 and System 2, which respectively produce fast and
slow thinking. I speak of the features of intuitive and deliberate thought as
if they were traits and dispositions of two characters in your mind. In the
picture that emerges from recent research, the intuitive System 1 is more
influential than your experience tells you, and it is the secret author of
many of the choices and judgments you make. Most of this book is about the
workings of System 1 and the mutual influences between it and System 2.
